The Independence Institute’s Todd Shepherd, along with this blog, have spent two years covering, and ultimately exposing, what is now the Abound Solar scandal. Understandably, much of the focus is now on Weld County District Attorney Ken Buck’s criminal investigation as well as a Congressional Oversight Committee inquiry into the bankrupt solar panel manufacturer.
Recently released emails on Complete Colorado indicate that, despite statements to the contrary, the White House politicized the Department of Energy (DOE) loan guarantee process for politically well-connected Abound.
But something else within those emails caught my attention reminding me of free market economist and Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman’s famous quote, “there is no such thing as a free lunch.” In other words, even things that appear to be free have an associated cost.
This basic economic concept is lost on Colorado State Representative Max Tyler’s (D-Lakewood) who in a March 23, 2010, press release bragged about a government-dictated increase in Colorado’s renewable energy mandate:
With HB 1001 we will manufacture and install panels and turbines all over Colorado to capture free energy….The sun will always shine for free, the winds will always blow for free, and our energy production will be cleaner. Renewable energy, green jobs, and a cleaner future — what’s not to like?
At roughly the same time that Tyler publicly fantasized about “free energy,” a credit advisor for the Department of Energy (DOE) loan guarantee program James McCrea was concerned about “major issues” with Abound Solar’s marketability. In an email dated April 1, 2010, just seven days after Tyler’s press release, McCrea explained:
Another issue is the very limited supply of telluride, its potential price trajectory and other demands for it. Related to this is a question of the viability of the Abound panels as compared to other panels and whether there is sufficient benefit to allow the panels to be profitable if Te [telluride] prices really increase. If the price really rises will there be alternative uses that can afford it basically turning it into a non available input for Abound?
I don’t believe we have ever worked with an input material that is so limited. We need to think that through carefully.
Before going bankrupt this summer, Abound produced cadmium telluride (CdTe) thin-filmed photovoltaic solar panels. Cadmium and tellurium, used in the manufacturing of Abound’s panels, are two of the world’s 17 “rare earth elements” that are needed for everything from smart phones to solar panels to high tech weapons systems. My former colleague Michael Sandoval, now an investigative reporter with the Heritage Foundation, and I have written several columns on general issues with rare earth elements.
This email highlights the problem specific to Abound, and McCrea was right to be concerned. According to the December 2011 DOE Critical Materials Strategy the price of tellurium has been going up since 2007:
The price dropped in 2006, but in 2007 resumed its upward trend owing to increased production of cadmium telluride (CdTe) solar cells.
Furthermore, China controls the vast majority of rare earth elements. In August 2012, the Chinese announced an ambitious plan to increase its stranglehold on the world’s available supply of rare earths. According to China Daily the country:
launched a physical trading platform for rare earth metals as part of its efforts to regulate the sector and strengthen its pricing power for the resources.
As the world’s largest producer of rare earth metals, China now supplies more than 90 percent of the global demand for rare earth metals, although its reserves account for just 23 percent of the world’s total.
The article reiterated what Michael and I have said on numerous occasions, mining rare earths comes with a significant environmental cost that green zealots like Tyler completely ignore when claiming solar energy is free and clean:
Mining the metals greatly damages the environment. In recent years, China has come down heavily on illegal mining and smuggling, cut export quotas and imposed production caps, stricter emissions standards and higher resource taxes to control environmental damage and stave off resource depletion.
However, these measures have irked rare earth importers, who complained about rising prices and strained supplies.
But China did exactly what it said it would do in 2009. It drove up prices with reduced output as global demand increased.
China’s rare earth output fell 36 percent year on year to 40,000 tonnes in the first half of the year. Prices of major rare earth products in July remained twice as high as prices at the beginning of 2011, although down from the beginning of the year.
In July 2009, about a year before President Barack Obama announced a $400 million loan guarantee for Abound, Jack Lifton, an expert on sources and uses of rare minerals, wrote a lengthy article for Resource Investor about the availability of tellurium for First Solar, a global leader in cadmium telluride solar panel manufacturering. Lifton’s conclusion should have served as a prophetic warning for Abound and any hope of profitability:
A company such as First Solar, which is critically dependent on a secure supply of tellurium to exist and on an unsustainable growth in the supply to it of tellurium for it to grow and achieve competitive pricing is a big risk for short-term investors. The maximum supply and production levels attainable of tellurium are quantifiable even if the actual production figures are murky, and they do not bode well for the future of First Solar if it must make profits to survive.
The next time you hear a politician like Max Tyler tout the benefits of “free” and “clean” energy, remember Abound Solar because there is no such thing as a free lunch.
For all the ink that Colorado’s public officials have spilled on the subject of the New Energy Economy, there’s been little discussion of its cost.
Ex-Governor Bill Ritter, for example, recently took to the pages of the New York Times to brag about his energy legacy. While he made an unsubstantiated claim about creating “thousands of new jobs,” he ignored the inconvenient truth that Xcel’s rates increased precipitously during his tenure, despite the fact that electricity demand was down due to an economic recession.
To be sure, it’s difficult to isolate an annual cost figure for the New Energy Economy. For starters, there’s a lot of policies to investigate; as ex-Governor Ritter noted in his New York Times op-ed, he enacted a suite of expensive energy policies (57 laws, to be exact). Moreover, utility accounting is arcane and largely opaque. So discerning the sum cost of these disparate measures is not easy, which is why no one has yet calculated the annual cost of the New Energy Economy…until now.
The problem with “green” energy is that it costs more than conventional energy. We can all agree that a solar powered future would be great, but most of us also agree that we’re not willing to pay five to ten times what we pay now for energy in order to try to achieve that future.
According to the federal Energy Information Administration’s projection of future electricity costs, in 2016 wind power will be nearly 50 percent more expensive than coal and nearly 80 percent more expensive than natural gas. Thermal solar generation is projected to be 150 percent more expensive than coal, and 200 percent more expensive than gas.
Colorado lawmakers, however, would have you believe that they can control the costs of green energy. Since 2004, the State has had a Renewable Electricity Standard, a requirement that the State’s investor-owned utilities generate a certain percentage of electricity from renewable sources. This year, utilities must provide 12 percent of their electricity with renewable energy; by 2020, it is 30 percent. In addition to production quotas, lawmakers also established price controls. By statute, the retail rate impact of acquiring green energy to meet the Renewable Electricity Standard is limited to 2 percent of annual sales. That is, green energy is not supposed to increase utility bills by more than 2 percent annually.
On February 16, Xcel filed a request with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to reduce its Solar*Rewards payment, a subsidy for on-site solar photovoltaic installations, from $2.35/watt installed electricity generating capacity, to $1.25/watt. The next day, Xcel suspended the program, pending the PUC’s decision on its request.
Last Friday, solar industry supporters descended on the Capitol to protest Xcel’s suspension of solar subsidies. They claim that as many as 3,000 jobs have been jeopardized by the utility’s decision. Tomorrow (Wednesday March 2), the Senate Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Energy Committee will hold a hearing on the subsidy cut.
Clearly, the Solar*Rewards program is now at the fore of Colorado energy policy. This post is a long, dry primer on the matter.
What’s at Issue: Solar*Rewards
Xcel’s Solar*Rewards program subsidizes “on-site” solar power. It was implemented by Xcel in 2006, in order to help meet the goals set by Amendment 37, a 2004 ballot initiative that established a renewable energy production quota. The quota, known as Renewable Electricity Standard, required investor-owned utilities to generate at least 10 percent of their electricity with renewable energy by 2020. In 2007, the General Assembly enacted, and Governor Bill Ritter signed, HB 1281, which increased the production quota to 20 percent by 2020. And in 2010, the General Assembly enacted, and Governor Bill Ritter signed, HB 1001, which increased the Renewable Electricity Standard to 30 percent by 2020.
On Tuesday November 30, former Colorado Senator Tim Wirth wrote an op-ed for the Denver Post on Colorado’s “Clean Energy Economy.” The article, titled, “Leading the way to a sustainable energy future,” is mostly wrong.
To wit, he suggested that the 2010 Clean Air Clean Jobs Act (CACJA), legislation that effectively requires fuel switching from coal to natural gas, is a welcome alternative to “waiting for the EPA to mandate a plan to deal with air pollutants.” This is the same Big Brother bogeyman that the Ritter Administration used to push the bill through the General Assembly.
In fact, there is no federal crackdown. The CACJA furthers compliance with provisions of the Clean Air Act that afford Colorado great discretion in choosing pollution control strategies. As such, it was the Ritter administration’s choice to require ultra expensive coal fired controls. For political purposes, the Ritter administration pinned the blame for its onerous regulations on the federal government. This phantom federal threat, in turn, was the justification for fuel switching.